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Morris: Florida's Six-Member Criminal Juries: Constitutional, but Are The

CASE COMMENTS

FLORIDA'S SIX-MEMBER CRIMINAL JURIES:
CONSTITUTIONAL, BUT ARE THEY FAIR?*
Williams v. Florida,399 U.S. 78 (1970)
Petitioner was convicted of robbery and based an appeal on the trial
court's refusal to impanel a twelve-member jury, instead of the six-member
jury allowed under Florida law.2 Petitioner claimed his sixth amendment
right to trial by jury had been violated. The Third District Court of Appeal
affirmed the conviction.3 On certiorarP, the United States Supreme Court
HELD, Florida's law specifying a six-member jury in noncapital cases did not
violate petitioner's constitutional rights. 5 Justice Marshall dissented; five
justices concurred in four opinions.,
Although there is no reference in the United States Constitution to jury
size,7 the Supreme Court until 1968 had held that where the word "jury" was
used, it referred to a common law jury.8 The court identified three essential
elements in a common law jury trial: the jury should have twelve members;
that trial should be conducted under a judge to advise the jury; and the
verdict should be unanimous. 9 Twelve-member juries were required by the
* EDrroR's NoTE: This case comment was awarded the George W. Milam Award as the
outstanding case comment submitted by a Junior Candidate in the summer 1970 quarter.
1. Petitioner also appealed based on the denial of a motion for excuse from the state
alibi-notice rule, which requires a defendant to give notice before trial of an alibi defense
and disclose his alibi witnesses. The majority held that the rule did not violate petitioner's
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 399 U.S. 78, 83 (1970). The opinion
by Justice White noted the state was required to provide in return the names of rebuttal
witnesses and said the procedure was to "enhance the search for truth." Id. at 82. The
opinion also specified that the Court was not ruling on the validity of the threatened sanction in the alibi notice rule that the alibi witness would not be allowed to testify when
notice of them was not provided the prosecution in advance. Id. at 83 n.14. The rule is
FLA. R. Caim. P. 1.200. (Black and Douglas, JJ., jointly dissented on the alibi-notice
question; Blackmun, J., did not participate).
2. FLA. R. Cmm. P. 1.270 (1968). "Twelve persons shall constitute a jury to try all
capital cases, and six persons shall constitute a jury to try all other criminal cases."
3. Williams v. State, 224 So. 2d 406 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1969). The Florida supreme court
earlier had held that it was without jurisdiction to entertain petitioner's direct appeal from
the trial court. FLA. CONST. art. V, §4 (2).
4. 396 U.S. 955 (1969).
5. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
6. Id. at 105-45. (Burger, C.J., Harlan, Stewart, J.J., each concurred separately the latter
two dissenting in part; Black, Douglas, J.J., concurred jointly).
7. U.S. CONST. art. ill, §2, c. 3: "The trial of all Crimes . . . shall be by Jury . . .
Amendment VI: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have
been committed ....
" (Emphasis added.)
8. Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930); Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 345 (1898).
9. Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 288 (1930).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1971

1

Florida Law
Vol. 23, Iss. 2 [1971], Art. 12
CASEReview,
COMMENTS
Court in federal criminal cases,"' but this requirement was not applied to the
states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.:1
Florida, since 1877, has provided for twelve jurors in capital cases and six
jurors in all other cases.- Twelve other states have provisions for fewer than
twelve jurors. 3
In 1968 the Supreme Court held in Duncan v. Louisiana's that the sixth
amendment right to trial by jury was "fundamental to the American scheme
of justice" and was applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment. 15 The right was to be available in all criminal cases in which the sixth
amendment would apply if the case were in a federal court. 16 Duncan left
unanswered whether the essential elements of a common law jury trial that
had accompanied the right to a jury trial in federal courts (including the

10. See, e.g., Rassmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516 (1905); Thompson v. Utah, 170

U.S. 343 (1898).
11. The Court had previously gone so far as to hold that the due process requirement
of the fourteenth amendment did not apply a right to trial by jury at all. Maxwell v. Dow,
176 U.S. 581, 602-03 (1900); accord, Coates v. Lawrence, 46 F. Supp. 414, 423 (S.D. Ga. 1942),
afl'd, 131 F.2d 110 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 759 (1943). InThompson v. Utah, the
case usually cited as authority for the federal requirement of twelve-member juries, the
petitioner, convicted by a twelve-member jury, won a nev trial, which was held after Utah
had become a state under a new constitution creating eight-man juries. The Court held
the eight-man requirement was an ex post facto law concerning petitioner. 170 U.S. 343, 351
(1898). Since the state could have altered procedural rules, the Court was thus treating the
number of juries as a substantive right based on the sixth amendment. 399 U.S. 78, 90 n.26
(1970). Maxwell v. Dow, two years later, involved a crime committed after Utah had
entered the Union, and the Court held the petitioner was entitled only to the number of
jurors the Utah constitution and statutes specified. 176 U.S. 581 (1900).
12. Gibson v. State, 16 Fla. 291 (1877); FLA. STAT. §913.10 (1) (1969); Fla. Laws 1877,
ch. 3010, §6; FL". R. CRiM. P. 1.270.
13. ALAsxA CONsT. art. I, §11; ALAsKA STAT. §§11.75.030, 22.15.060, 22.15.150 (1962);
GA. CONsT. art. I, §2-105, art. VI, §2-5101; GA. CODE ANN. §27-2506 (1965); IOWA CONST.
art. I, §9; IOWA CODE ANN. §§602.15, .25, .39, 687.7 (1950); Ky. CONsr. §§7, 11, 248; Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§25.010, .014, 26,400, 29,915 (1963); LA. CONsT. art. VII, §41; LA. CRIM.
PRO. CODE ANN. art. 779 (Vest Supp. 1969); Miss. CONST. art. III, §31, art. VI, §171; Miss.
CODE ANN. §§1831, 1836, 1839 (1942); OKLA. CONsr. art. II, §§19, 20; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
11, §§958.3, .6, tit. 21, §10 (1961); ORE. CONST. art. I, §11; ORE. REy. STAT. §§5.110, 46.040,

.175, .180 (1967); S.C. CONsr. art. I, §§18, 25, art. 5, §22; S.C. CODE ANN. §§15.618,
(1962); TEx. CONST. art. I, §§10, 15, art. V, §17; TEx. CODE CuM. PROC. ANN. arts. 4.07,
(1966); TEx. PEN. CODE art. 1148 (1961); UTAH CONsr. art. I, §§10, 12; UTAH CODE
§78-46-5 (1953); VA. CONSr. art. I. §8; VA. CODE ANN. §§16.1-123, -124, -126, -129, -132,

-.612
37.02
ANN.

-136,

18.1-6, 19.1-206 (1960), §18.1-9 (Supp. 1970).

14. 391 US. 145 (1968).
15. Id. at 149. The Court noted it was shifting its approach on incorporation of sections
of the Bill of Rights from the prior abstract method of considering whether a fair trial was

possible without a jury to a practical approach of considering whether a particular procedure is fundamental to the "Anglo-American regime of ordered liberty." Id. at 149-50
n.14. The Court also specifically stated it rejected dicta in previous cases that the right to
jury was not fundamental. Id. at 155.

16. Id. at 156. On the same day the instant case was decided the Court ruled that
where there is a possibility of a sentence of more than six months imprisonment, the crime
is serious enough to warrant a jury trial. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970).
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twelve-man jury requirement)71 would be required in state courts by the
fourteenth amendment.18
The Supreme Court noted in the instant case that although the common
law jury consisted of twelve members "that particular feature in the jury
system appears to have been an historical accident, unrelated to the great
purposes which gave rise to the jury in the first place." 0 Previous cases,
including the often-cited Thompson v. Utah,-o assumed this "accidental
feature" was embedded in the Constitution, but after extensive historical
analysis a majority of the Court in the instant casse concluded that twelve
jurors are not required by the Constitution. Although conceding that the
drafters of the sixth amendment may have expected juries to consist of
twelve men, the majority concluded that the framers showed no intent to
place this characteristic in the Constitution.The Court indicated that the purpose of jury trial is to prevent oppression
by the government by placing the common sense judgment of laymen between
the accused and the accuser. 22 This purpose is accomplished, the Court said,
where there are enough jurors to promote group deliberation and to provide
a fair possibility of obtaining a representative cross section of the community.
If this result were achieved the number of jurors is not inportant.2 8
The instant decision will allow the states wide latitude in determining
the size of juries in criminal cases, although the Court indicated that a reasonable minimum is necessary. 24 The publicity accompanying the decision could
lead states with provisions for twelve-member juries to reexamine their laws
17. Since Duncan four persons, including the instant petitioner, have appealed convictions unsuccessfully in Florida courts, claiming they were denied their right to a twelve-

man jury. Hearns v. State, 223 So. 2d 738 (Fla. 1969); Moffett v. State, 227 So. 2d 219 (3d
D.CA. Fla. 1969); Williams v. State, 224 So. 2d 406 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1969); Morgan v. State,
223 So. 2d 801 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1969).

18. The majority in Duncan acknowledged the question but did not believe application
of the common law rules would require widespread changes of state law. Further, the Court
indicated that its decisions interpreting the sixth amendment were always open for reconsideration. 391 U.S. 145, 158 n.30 (1968). Justices Harlan and Stewart, dissenting in part
and concurring in part, preferred basing the decision on a fundamental right or due pro.
cess approach, which would not have applied the sixth amendment per se to the states.
They said the majority's incorporation of the sixth amendment into the fourteenth would
require transferring the unanimity and twelve-member jury provisions to the states even
though they are not fundamental or essential to the right of jury trial. Id. at 181-82. In his
concurring opinion Justice Harlan similarly criticized the "incorporationist" logic because
it forces dropping the prior constitutional protection of a twelve-member jury on the
federal level as well as the state level. 399 U.S. 78, 118 (1970).
19. 399 U.S. 78, 89-90 (1970).
20. 170 U.S. 348 (1898).
21. 399 U.S. 78, 98-99 (1970). Justices Harlan and Marshall criticized the majority's

search for intent and noted that the Court previously had interpreted the Constitution in
light of the common law. Id. at 116-17, 124.

22. Id. at 100.
23.

Id.

24. Id. at 91 n.28. Concerning the theory that if a jury can be the reduced from twelve

to six there, is nothing to keep it from being further reduced or dispensed with entirely,
the Court said the theory "suffers somewhat as soon as one recognizes that he can get off
the 'slippery slope' before he reaches bottom." Id.
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and perhaps decrease jury size. Whether this would mean a higher conviction
rate is not certain. While the larger jury might seem to give a defendant a
greater chance of finding a juror who would hold out for acquittal, is would
also give the state a greater chance of finding one juror to hold
out against acquittal. The Court noted that the few existing studies have
shown no discernible difference in results between six- and twelve-member
juries.2 51 One study indicated the chances of a hold out on a twelve-member
jury are greater when there are three or four other jurors who agree with the
dissenting juror at the start of the deliberations. Apparently, group pressure is
26
perceived more strongly when there is an li-1 or 10-2 split at the outset.
Presumably, the pressure would be less with a smaller jury and a lone dissenter
at the outset of deliberations might be more likely to hold to his opinion. This
obviously could disadvantage the state as well as the defendant.
Another essential feature of the common law jury was the unanimity requirement, which the Court had held to be ancillary to the sixth amendment
guarantee. 27 The instant decision reopens this issue since the opinion held
that another common law feature (size) was no longer ancillary. If the
Court finds unanimous verdicts are not required by the Constitution, it would
be free to change the federal criminal procedure rule that calls for unanim8
ity.2 Conversely, unanimity is found to be required by the sixth amendment;
the laws in at least four states2" that allow majority verdicts presumably
would be unconstitutional under Duncan.30 The Court specifically refrained
from deciding whether unanimity is an indispensable element of a jury trial
but noted that this requirement arguably serves a vital role in the jury function by insuring that the Government bear the heavier burden of proof. Thus,
unanimity is likely to be a constitutional requirement. 3' Possibly indicating
its future attitude on the matter, the Court stated there is little reason to
believe the jury's function would be less likely to be achieved with six members than with twelve, "particularly if the requirement of unanimity is
32
retained."
25. Id. at 101.
H. KALVEN, JR. & H. ZmSEL, TiE AMERICAN JURY 462-63 (1966).
27. American Publishing Co. v. Fisher, 166 U.S. 464 (1897). The third ancillary element
is that the trial should be in the presence and under the supervision of a judge having
power to instruct jurors as to the law and in respect of the facts. Capital Traction Co. v.
26.

Hof, 174 U.S. 1 (1899).
28. FE. R. CIuM. P. 31 (a).
29. IDAHO CONsT. art. I, §7; LA. Cran. PROC. CODE ANN., art. 782 (West Supp. 1969);
MONT. REv. CODEs ANN. §95-1915 (Supp. 1969); OKLA. CONsr. art. 2, §19. Concern for law and
order could cause more states to adopt majority verdict provisions. A study of hung juries has
shown that allowing ten of twelve jurors to decide the case would have obtained 34% more
convictions and 8% more acquittals. H. KALVEN, JR. & H. ZmsEL, supra note 26, at 461 n.6.
30. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
31. 399 US. 78, 100 n.46 (1970).
32. Id. at 100. A possible indication that unanimity has been considered more important than jury size is that courts have held a defendant may not waive his right to a unanimout verdict. E.g., Hibdon v. United States, 204 F.2d 834, 838 (6th Cir. 1953). Defendants have, however, been allowed to waive their right to a twelve-man jury when one
juror has been dismissed. Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 298-99 (1930); Coates v.
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The Court had earlier held the common law elements of a jury trial were
also contained in the seventh amendment, 83 which provides for jury trials in
civil actions involving an amount exceeding twenty dollars. The instant
decision could reopen that issue, since the Court noted that much of its
consideration of historical intent underlying the sixth amendment could
apply with equal force to the seventh amendment. The opinion also noted,
however, that the specific reference to "rules of the Common Law" in the
seventh amendment indicated the drafters intended to incorporate common
34
law rules within the seventh amendment.
Another question not answered by the instant case is whether a state
could allow fewer than twelve jurors in a capital case. Although the Court's
historical reasoning would seem to negate any common law basis for requiring retention of twelve-member juries where the death penalty could be
imposed, the Court might find a practical reason for the larger jury. The
opinion noted that no state appears to allow fewer than twelve jurors in
capital cases and suggested that states find a value in the larger body "as a
means of legitimating society's decision to impose the death penalty." 35
Presumably, a requirement of twelve jurors in capital cases could be applied
to the states as ancillary to the sixth and fourteenth amendments and in a
manner similar to application of the exclusionary rule ancillary to fourth
36
amendment search and seizure provisions.
In the instant case the Court found no historical or functional reason for
a federal constitutional requirement of a twelve-member jury and noted that
state legislatures may base jury size on other considerations.Y Two aspects
of the instant opinion, however, should be examined on a functional level

by states that have or contemplate having smaller juries: the Court's emphasis
on "protection from oppression" as the function of a jury38 and the statement
in the opinion that only negligible differences in the obtainable community
cross section would result from choosing twelve or six-member juries.39
Although the Court stressed the purpose of protection against arbitrary
prosecution and biased judges found in Duncan v. Louisiana,40 several
other possible purposes have been identified by commentators. For example,
the jury is said not only to act as a humanizing factor in enforcing or not
enforcing impersonal or unpopular laws, but also to induce public confidence
in the administration of justice through individual participation in government and to serve as an educating force in the community.41 While these
Lawrence, 46 F. Supp. 414, 423 (S.D. Ga. 1942), aff'd, 131 F.2d 110 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,

318 U.S. 759 (1943).
33.

Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1 (1899).

34. 399 U.S. 78, 92 n.30 (1970).
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. at 103.
See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657, 660 (1961).
399 U.S. 78, 103 (1970).
Id.
Id..
391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968).
Broeder, The Functions of the Jury: Facts or Fictions?, 21 U. Cm. L. REv. 386

(1954).
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purposes are interrelated, they can be divided into two basic functional categories: (1) the jury as a deliberative body exchanging ideas and discussing
facts in reaching a decision and (2) the jury as the conscience of the community, reflecting different backgrounds and deciding what an "ordinary,
reasonably prudent" person would do in similar circumstances. 42 Although
the Court in the instant decision acknowledged that the "common-sense
judgment of a group of laymen," as well as community participation and
shared responsibility were needed features of the "protection-purpose" jury, 43
those features may become more vital if viewed as purposes themselves.
The Court's statement that the difference in the number of community
viewpoints represented on randomly selected juries of six or twelve members
would be "negligible" also deserves further examination.- Although acknowledging that there should be enough jurors to promote group deliberation
and to provide for a fair possibility of obtaining a cross section of the community4 5 the Court regarded concern that the cross section would be
diminished by a reduction from twelve to six jurors as "unrealistic,"4
since arbitrary exclusion of a particular class from jury rolls is unconstitutional. Such brief treatment is not convincing. 47 What constitutes a representative cross section deserves more study, particularly at a time when minority
racial or ideological groups are asserting that it is impossible for them to
obtain a fair trial.48
42. C. JOINER, CIVIL JUSTICE AND THE JURY 25-38 (1962). Joiner's view is supported by
this quotation from Justice Hunt: "Twelve men of the average of the community, comprising
men of education and men of little education, men of learning and men whose learning consists only in what they have themselves seen and heard, the merchant, the mechanic, the
farmer, the laborer; these sit together, consult, apply their separate experience of the
affairs of life to the facts proven, and draw a unanimous conclusion. This average judgment
thus given it is the great effort of the law to obtain. It is assumed that twelve men know
more of the common affairs of life than does one man; that they can draw wiser and safer
conclusions from admitted facts thus occurring, than can a single judge." Sioux City &
Pac. R.R. v. Stout, 84 U.S. 657, 664 (1873).
43. 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970).
44. Id. at 102.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. The statement: "A six man jury would also be large enough to provide a crosssection of the community" was made without examination of the matter in Wiehl, The Six
Man Jury, 4 GONZAGA L. REv. 35, 39 (1968), one of the materials cited by the Court. Id.
at 90 n. 25.
48. TIME, April 6, 1970, at 61. These assertions often have a factual basis. One study
indicates, for example, that jurors have less sympathy for Negro defendants than for white
defendants. H. KALVEN, JR. & H. ZEis.L, supra note 26, at 211-12. Other data support a
belief that Negro defendants have not received equal protection. In the South between
1930 and 1957, 361 blacks and 38 whites were executed for rape. J. GREENBERG, RACE
RELTIONS AND AMERICAN LAW 336 (1959). In Florida between 1940 and 1964, 152 blacks
and 132 whites were convicted of rape; 48 blacks and only 6 whites were sentenced to
death; 29 blacks and only I white actually were electrocuted. Craig v. State, 179 So. 2d
202, 204-05 (Fla. 1965). Upon similar data in 1959 the Florida supreme court found no
showing of violation of equal protection. Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654, 657 (Fla. 1959);
accord, Thomas v. State, 92 So. 2d 621 (Fla. 1957); State ex rel. Copeland v. Mayo, 87 So.
2d 501 (Fla. 1956).
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Based on voter registration figures for Florida (a person must be registered
to be eligible for jury service), one of every nine potential jurors is black.49
Computing probability from that ratio, a defendant in Florida has less than
a fifty per cent chance of trial by a six-member jury that includes a black
person.- A system that has half its juries composed entirely of white members
does not accurately reflect the community ethnic ratio since, according to
Florida population totals, one in every six residents is black51 and since a
disproportionate number of criminal defendants are black. Expanding the
jury to twelve members would more than double the likelihood of a black
juror, but there still would be a twenty-four per cent chance of an all-white
jury. Even if the voter registration requirement were dropped (or Negroes
registered at the same ratio as whites), so that one in six potential jurors
were black, one-third of defendants would draw all-white six-member juries.
Under those circumstances, however, only eleven per cent of defendants would
receive all-white twelve-member juries.52
These percentage differences between six- and twelve-member juries do
not seem "negligible" as the Court termed them. This is not to recommend
that Florida immediately increase the size of its juries to twelve members
or that an artificial method be used to assure minority group representation
on juries. It does suggest, however, that inequities exist in the current system,
which tend to deprive at least one large minority group of the very confidence
in the judicial system that the jury is intended to provide.5The holding in the instant case permits Florida to continue its six-member
juries or to revise them. The likely reason for Florida's adoption of sixmember juries in 187754 was the difficulty and expense of obtaining a sufficient
49.

As of Oct. 5, 1968, there were 308,092 registered blacks and 2,401,757 registered whites.
r 394 (3d ed. 1969).
50. Computation is carried out by multiplying eight-ninths, the ratio of whites to total
population, to the sixth power for a six-member jury and to the twelfth power for a twelvemember jury. Statistical treatment, of course, cannot take inco account changes in jury
makeup after the random selection for cause or by peremptory challenges.
51. The 1960 census in Florida recorded 4,063,881 white persons, 880, 186 black persons,
and 7,493 members of other races. STATLcCAL ABsRAcr OF THE UNrrED STATEs 27 (90th ed.
1969). The 1970 census figures showing racial breakdown were not yet released at the time
of this writing. They are expected to show a large rise in a third ethnic group, Cubans, who
have arrived in Florida since 1960. The existence of a third significant ethnic group in
certain parts of the state further complicates consideration of community cross sections in
those areas.
52. The computation here is carried out by multiplying five-sixths to the sixth and
twelfth powers, respectively.
53. For a discussion concluding that black defendants are not receiving fair trials and
a proposal for "community" juries see Note, The Case for Black Juries, 79 YALE LJ. 531
(1970). But see Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 203-04 (1965), in which the Supreme Court
held that a defendant has no absolute right to have a juror of his own race and only a
deliberate exclusion of minority group members from juries violated the equal protection
clause.
54. Fla. Laws 1877, ch. 3010, §6. The law was enabled by an 1875 constitutional amend,
ment, Fla. Laws 1875, ch. 2041, which provided: "The number of jurors for the trial of
causes in any court may be fixed by law." The current provision specifies: "The . . .
number of jurors, not fewer than six, shall be fixed by law." FLA. CONSr. art. 1, §22.

FLORIDA STATISnCAL AB s
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number of jurors. At that time, Florida's population was smaller and comparatively more rural than today. 5 The fact that women were not allowed
to serve on juries compounded the problem. 56 Although these historical
reasons for Florida's six-member jury are not completely valid today, if a
larger jury were now required expense would still be a factor. Moreover,
savings in court time might be a related factor, since the voir dire for a
larger jury would take longer. Furthermore, despite the increase in population, some areas apparently still experience difficulty in obtaining sufficient
5
numbers of jurors. 7
The primary consideration of those responsible for the judicial system
should be a fair ensuring and impartial trial for all accused and adopting
the best methods of obtaining such a trial. Tradition, whether it began in
the middle ages or in 1877, should not be the decisive factor in obtaining
such a system.
THOMAS E. MoRus

55. Florida's population was 187,748 in 1870 and 269,493 in 1880. FLORmA STATssrcA
ABSrAcr 16 (2d ed. 1968). Today, the population is more than 6,150,000. STATISrcAL
AnRACr OF THE UNITED STATES 12 (90th ed. 1969).
56. Women were not allowed to serve on juries until 1949 and then only when they
registered to serve. Fla. Laws 1949, ch. 25, §126. This provision was upheld in Hoyt v.
Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961). See generally Note, Jury Service for Women, 12 U. FLA. L. RPv.
224 (1959). In 1967 the registration requirement was dropped and women became eligible
under the same standards as men with the exception that expectant mothers or mothers
with children under age 18 may decline. FLA. STAT. §40.01 (1) (1969).
57. Interview with George R. Georgieff, Assistant Attorney General of Florida, in
Gainesville, Fla., July 22, 1970. Some residents of Dade County have threatened to move to
another county because of the frequency with which they are called to jury duty. In rural
counties it is said to be occasionally necessary for a court officer to go out on the street
and find people willing to serve on a jury. Possibly reforms of the methods of juror selection could ease this problem. The principal qualifications for jury service are that a person
be over age 21, a citizen of Florida, and an elector of his county. FLA. STAT. §40.01 (1) (1969).
"Elector" is defined as "voter or qualified elector or voter," meaning a person registered to
vote. FLA. STAT. §97.021 (5) (1969). For a discussion of the selection process and a recommendation that the registered voter requirement be dropped see Note, Jury Selection in
Florida, 15 U. FLA. L. REv. 500, 519 (1963). About 72% of Florida residents 21 or older are
registered to vote, but the 28% not registered constitutes a pool of more than 1 million
people who are not being tapped for jury duty. See FLORIDA STATISTICAL ABsrRAcr 393-94
(3d ed. 1969).
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